What makes balance sheet effects detrimental for the country risk premium? by Berganza, Juan Carlos & García Herrero, Alicia
WHAT MAKES BALANCE
SHEET EFFECTS DETRIMENTAL
FOR THE COUNTRY RISK PREMIUM?
Documentos de Trabajo 
N.º 0423
Juan Carlos Berganza and Alicia García-Herrero  
2004
WHAT MAKES BALANCE SHEET EFFECTS DETRIMENTAL FOR THE COUNTRY RISK 
PREMIUM? 
WHAT MAKES BALANCE SHEET EFFECTS DETRIMENTAL FOR THE 
COUNTRY RISK PREMIUM? 
Juan Carlos Berganza and Alicia García-Herrero (*) 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 
 (*) Both authors are affiliated with Banco de España (jcberganza@bde.es or alicia.garcia-herrero@bde.es). The opinions 
expressed are those of the authors’ and not necessarily those of Banco de España. The authors would like to thank
Lucía Cuadro for excellent research assistance, and Carlos Arteta, Raquel Carrasco, Eduardo Levy-Yeyati, Juan Ruiz, 
José Viñals and an anonymous referee for their useful comments and suggestions as well as participants to the Banco 
de España and IMF International Conference on Dollars, Debt, and Deficits: 60 Years After Bretton Woods, the NBER 
Inter-American Seminar on Economics, the IX Meeting of the CEMLA Research Network and the 9th Lacea Meeting.
Remaining errors are only ours. 
Documentos de Trabajo. N.º 0423 
2004 
The Working Paper Series seeks to disseminate original research in economics and finance. All papers 
have been anonymously refereed. By publishing these papers, the Banco de España aims to contribute 
to economic analysis and, in particular, to knowledge of the Spanish economy and its international 
environment. 
The opinions and analyses in the Working Paper Series are the responsibility of the authors and, 
therefore, do not necessarily coincide with those of the Banco de España or the Eurosystem. 
The Banco de España disseminates its main reports and most of its publications via the INTERNET at the 
following website: http://www.bde.es.
Reproduction for educational and non-commercial purposes is permitted provided that the source is 
acknowledged. 
© BANCO DE ESPAÑA, Madrid, 2004 
ISSN: 0213-2710 (print) 
ISSN: 1579-8666 (on line) 
Depósito legal: M.54221-2004      
Imprenta del Banco de España 
Abstract
This paper builds upon the empirical literature on the macroeconomic impact of real 
exchange rate depreciations for a sample of 27 emerging economies. We find that real 
exchange rate depreciations tend to increase a country’s risk premium. This effect is neither 
linear nor symmetric: large real exchange depreciations are much more detrimental and real 
appreciations do not seem to reduce the risk premium. We also show that the main channels 
for the real exchange rate to affect country risk are external and domestic balance sheet 
effects, stemming from the sudden increase in the stock of external or domestic 
dollar-denominated debt, respectively. This is particularly the case in the countries with the 
largest financial imperfections. Competitiveness is not an important enough factor to outweigh 
this negative effect. Finally, fixed exchange rate regimes tend to amplify balance sheet effects, 
beyond the extent of real depreciations. The data indicates that it could be due to a larger 
accumulation of external debt under fixed regimes. 
JEL classification: F31, F34, F41 
Key words: balance sheet effects, financial accelerator theories, exchange rate regime 
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1 Introduction
During the second half of the 1990s emerging countries have experienced very large swings 
in the external cost of capital as well as several financial crises, with a large impact on 
economic growth. For this reason, academics and practitioners interested in emerging 
economies are paying increasing attention to the determinants of a country’s risk premium. 
An important one is the real exchange rate, since it is particularly volatile in emerging regions, 
as compared to industrial ones. Besides, there is a strand of literature exploring the direct link 
between real exchange fluctuations and economic performance, which can serve as a basis 
to analyze the relation between the real exchange rate and the risk premium. 
Conventional open economy models, and in particular the influential 
Mundell-Fleming, argue that real depreciations have an expansionary effect by switching 
global demand towards domestic production. Already in 1986, Edwards (1986) challenges 
this view on several grounds: the possible contractionary effect of a higher price level after a 
devaluation as well as a potential negative impact on income distribution. He also finds some 
evidence of a small contractionary effect for a sample of 12 developing countries. More 
recently, theories based on what has started to be known as the open economy 
Bernanke-Gertler-Gilchrist financial accelerator, have challenged the Mundell-Fleming view. If 
a country’s debt is denominated in foreign currency, a real depreciation will reduce the 
country’s net worth through a balance sheet effect and, in the presence of financial 
imperfections, may increase the cost of capital. This is particularly relevant for emerging 
economies given their relatively large share of foreign currency denominated debt, the 
frequency of large real depreciations and the presence of financial imperfections. 
In an earlier work, Berganza, Chang and García-Herrero (2003) develop a simple 
theoretical framework to understand the relation between balance sheets –stemming from the 
increase in the external debt service after a real depreciation– and a country’s risk premium 
and find evidence of a positive relation between the two. This could have several policy 
implications, such as the need to reduce foreign currency indebtness and/or limit, to the 
extent possible, financial imperfections. It could also have implications for the choice of the 
exchange rate regime since avoiding real exchange rate depreciations becomes crucial for a 
country’s cost of credit. 
Given the relevance of the matter, it seems worthwhile investigating the issue further. 
In particular, we would like to understand why –and under which circumstances– balance 
sheet effects increase a country’s cost of borrowing. Among these questions we shall 
study: i) Whether real exchange depreciations are detrimental for country risk; and to what 
extent and under which circumstances this is the case. (ii) Whether real exchange 
appreciations are beneficial. (iii) Which are the channels of influence of a real depreciation on 
country risk; in particular, whether “domestic” balance sheets, stemming from the increase in 
domestic foreign currency denominated debt after a real depreciation are as important as 
“external” balance sheet effects. (iv) What is the role of competitiveness, as the most 
important channel in the traditional literature of the expansionary effects of real 
depreciations. (v) Whether balance sheet effects are influenced by the existence of financial 
imperfections, as one would expect from the financial accelerator literature. And, 
finally (vi) Whether the exchange rate regime plays a role in how balance sheets affect country 
risk, beyond the extent of real depreciation. 
Investigating these issues will help us delimit the extent to which emerging countries 
should worry about real depreciations, depending on their own characteristics. In the same 
vein, it should contribute to identifying which are the most appropriate policy actions to 
minimize this problem. 
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2 Review of the literature 
Most theoretical models on the impact of balance sheet effects draw from the open economy 
version of the financial accelerator, developed by Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci (2003). They 
generally show that balance sheet effects, related to a sudden reduction in net wealth, are 
detrimental either in terms of the cost of capital or output. However, this result hinges on the 
existence of financial imperfections. Given these conditions, the ultimate answer to the 
question of whether balance sheet effects are detrimental and when will be an empirical one. 
To our knowledge the only work which deals with this issue at the 
macro level is that of Berganza, Chang and García-Herrero (2003), who find that balance 
sheet effects –stemming from the increase in the external debt service after a real 
depreciation– raise a country’s risk premium for emerging economies. As for firm-level data, 
Forbes (2002) analyzes the impact of 12 major depreciations on a sample of emerging 
countries’ large firms and finds no significant balance sheet effects on performance although 
firms with higher debt ratios tend to show lower net income growth. It should be noted, 
though, that Forbes does not take into account the currency composition of debt. In the 
same vein, Bleakley and Cowan (2002) show evidence that the competitiveness effect 
associated with exchange rate depreciations offsets the potential contractive balance sheet 
effect on investment for a panel of Latin American firms. The authors, therefore, conclude that 
there is no severe currency mismatch of output and liabilities in their sample. This optimistic 
result should, however, be taken cautiously, since no country fixed effects are considered and 
Brazilian firms account for half of the observations. In fact, when each country is analyzed 
separately, always with firm-level data, there is evidence of detrimental balance sheet effects 
on investment in some countries (namely, Colombia, Mexico and Peru) but not in others 
(Brazil, Chile)1. Furthermore, a macroeconomic empirical analysis, such as ours, may offer a 
more pessimistic picture of balance sheet effects in as far as it is not only the tradable sector 
which is considered but the whole economy. This has fewer possibilities to hedge its negative 
wealth in foreign currency than the group of large firms considered in the firm-level empirical 
studies.
                                                                         
1. Galindo, Panizza and Schiantarelli (2003) offer a survey of the results. 
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3 Objective of the paper 
The objective of this paper is to investigate, at the aggregate level, whether and in which way 
real exchange rate depreciations increase a country’s risk premium, with particular attention 
to balance sheet effects. To this end, a number of questions are analyzed.  
The first is whether an exchange rate depreciation increases a country’s risk 
premium and under which circumstances this is the case. In principle, this should 
happen if balance sheet effects more than counterweigh the expected increase in 
competitiveness associated with a real depreciation. The question is why it is so for some 
countries and not for others. Identifying these differences is not an easy task but certainly 
interesting for policy makers, so as to know to which extent they should worry about real 
depreciations.
A second interesting question is whether the impact of real exchange rate 
depreciations and appreciations is symmetric. An asymmetry –whereby appreciations 
had no significant impact– would make the volatility of the real exchange rate more of a cause 
of concern for  policy makers since there would be no instance to benefit from it (i.e., from 
appreciations). Financial accelerator theories argue in favor of an asymmetric effect of 
changes in net wealth since agency problems may only be binding when the debtor’s 
situation worsens [Bernanke and Gertler (1989)]. Another reason for such an asymmetry 
could be drawn from the literature on liquidity constraints, which should only be relevant when 
a sudden increase in indebtness occurs and not when there is a net worth gain. A related 
question is whether the extent of a real depreciation affects the risk premium more than 
proportionally; that is, if its impact is non-linear. If the answer is yes, this may have a bearing 
on the choice of the exchange rate regime since there may be no need to worry about small 
depreciations but only about large events. Such non linearity could be expected on the basis 
of the same arguments as before since large changes in net worth should make financial and 
liquidity problems much more binding than relatively smaller ones.
The third question relates to the channels through which real exchange 
depreciations affect the risk premium. The most well known channel, the gain in 
competitiveness, should reduce the risk premium the more open a country is to trade. The 
other crucial channel is that of balance sheet effects, stemming from a sudden reduction in 
net financial wealth.  In the case of emerging countries, it seems safe to think of negative net 
financial wealth because of the generally large stock of debt that they have accumulated. In 
the financial accelerator literature, however, balance sheet effects hinge on the existence of 
financial imperfections, which we also need to test for. One interesting issue for policy makers 
is whether all balance sheets are the same; in other words, whether an increase in the stock 
of foreign currency-denominated debt held by non residents (“external” balance sheets) can 
have the same detrimental effect on the risk premium as an increase in the stock of foreign 
currency-denominated debt held by residents (“domestic” balance sheet effects). If the former 
were larger, this would be an argument in favor of increasing a country’s domestic 
indebtness, even if in foreign currency, as compared to external indebtness2. The rationale 
behind a lower cost of domestic balance sheet effects may be that having residents as 
holders of a country´s dollar liabilities, these will benefit from a real depreciation 
compensating, at least partially, the loss of wealth of the borrowers. In other words, the real 
depreciation will have distributional effects but will not necessarily reduce net financial wealth, 
as for external balance sheets. The extent of the wealth effects of domestic balance sheets 
may depend on what resident creditors do with their wealth gain. If they are uncertain about 
                                                                         
2. This, however, might not be in the range of options available to policymakers if domestic savings are very low. 
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repayment and/or the economic situation deteriorates sharply, they may opt for capital flight, 
eliminating the positive impact of the wealth gain on domestic spending or investment. The 
extent to which they reinvest their additional wealth may actually hinge on the existence of 
financial imperfections.  
The fourth question relates to the existence of financial imperfections, a
crucial condition for balance sheet effects to be relevant in the financial accelerator theories.
Given that our sample is composed of emerging countries, one could argue that they all suffer 
from financial imperfections. However, the degree to which this is the case varies from 
country to country. This is why it seems worth testing whether the countries with larger 
imperfections are also those which suffer from larger balance sheet effects. In addition, the 
role of financial imperfections could be different for domestic and external balance sheets. On 
the one hand, one could argue that external creditors are less affected by financial 
imperfections if the external debt is issued outside the country, but it is also true that the 
sovereign debtors have the power to change the rules of the game even in this case. In 
addition domestic creditors may be better informed of their rights, or possible changes in their 
rights. 
The fifth and final issue is the role of the exchange rate regime on how 
balance sheets affect country risk, beyond the extent of exchange rate change.
Several authors have developed this idea theoretically but no empirical test exists yet. Based 
on the financial accelerator literature, Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci (2003) argue that fixed 
exchange regimes amplify balance sheet effects because they force the central bank to adjust 
interest rates in a manner that enhances financial distress. Céspedes, Chang and 
Velasco (2004) show that flexible exchange rates play an insulating role in the presence of real 
external shocks so that they output and investment fall by less than under fixed exchange 
regimes. The channel is the higher expected real depreciation under a pegged regime, and 
thereby the increase in interest rates, since policy makers will tend to maintain the exchange 
rate regime during a relatively long period so as to minimize the size of the change in the 
relative prices. Another idea for pegged exchange rate regimes to be detrimental for financial 
fragility is that agents tend to feel more protected from exchange rate risk and do not hedge 
against it [Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2001)].  In this line, Ize and Levy-Yeyati (2003) 
and Broda and Levy-Yeyati (2003) argue that a pegged exchange regime may induce 
dollar-denominated indebtness, and financial dollarization in general, because it can be taken 
as an implicit insurance by the private sector, as well as a demonstration effect from the part 
of the government that the exchange rate regime is credible and will be maintained3. On the 
other hand, Elekdag and Tchakarov (2004) show that fixed regimes can be superior for 
countries with a high level of indebtness and whose monetary policy is constrained. This is, 
therefore, a question worth tackling empirically. We interact each country’s exchange rate 
regime with external and domestic balance sheets, and test whether their detrimental effect 
on the risk premium is larger for fixed regimes. Both de jure and de facto regime 
classifications are used. 
                                                                         
3. Although this idea cannot be fully tested with the data available, Galiani, Levy-Yeyati and Schargrodsky (2003) find 
indirect evidence that the currency board acted as an implicit insurance for the case of Argentina. 
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4 Data issues and empirical strategy 
The focus on the country as a whole and, thus, the use of macroeconomic data substantially 
limits the number of observations for this study. This is even more the case given the 
difficulties of proxying our dependent variable, country risk. The most widely used proxy in the 
literature are the returns implicit in the Emerging Markets Bond Indices (Embi) provided 
by JPMorgan, after having subtracted total returns of US treasury bonds4 (from now onwards 
this variable shall be named Embi). Appendix II offers details on variable definitions and data 
sources. The choice of the Embi, together with the condition we impose that at least four 
observations of Embi returns exist, limits our sample to 27 emerging economies and to the 
period 1993 to 2002 for most countries (for some countries the timeframe is even shorter). 
This yields an unbalanced panel with a total of 210 annual observations (Table 1 in 
Appendix I). 
The geographical distribution of the observations among regions can be found in 
Table 2 in Appendix I. All major emerging regions are represented although Latin America is 
overweighted (with 9 countries and 71 of the observations) and the Middle East is 
underweighted. 
Apart from the dependent variable (Embi), the focus of this study is the change in the 
real exchange rate. Two different measures are calculated: The first is relevant for foreign 
currency indebtness, namely the bilateral nominal exchange rate against the US dollar 
adjusted by the domestic inflation (Real Exchange Rate Change). We use the bilateral 
exchange rate since we assume that all foreign currency debt is denominated in US dollar. 
This is a relatively safe assumption for the countries in our sample. The second measure is 
relevant for competitiveness, namely the effective real exchange rate against the major trading 
partners (Multilateral Real Exchange Rate Change).
The other crucial concept is that of balance sheet effects, which stem from a 
reduction in financial net wealth after a real depreciation. In emerging countries we can safely 
assume that financial wealth is negative and corresponds with the stock of foreign 
currency-denominated debt. In other words, although we use a concept of gross (negative) 
financial wealth, net financial wealth is bound to be negative, although probably smaller. The 
main difference probably lies in the size of international reserves, which we shall include as a 
robustness exercise. Our results do not change. Another interesting issue is whether what 
matters to measure balance sheet effects is the change in the stock of debt, because of the 
depreciation, or the change in the amount a country needs to pay on that year (the debt 
service). We shall use the stock of debt as first option, since it is more in line with the concept 
of net wealth in the financial accelerator literature, but robustness test will be conducted with 
the debt service. The results do not change.  
We differentiate between domestic and external balance sheet effects. External
Balance Sheets are composed by the foreign-currency denominated debt held by non 
residents at the end of the previous period (External Debt_1) multiplied by the Real Exchange 
Rate Change. In turn, Domestic Balance Sheets are composed of the foreign-currency 
denominated debt held by residents at the end of the previous period (Domestic Debt_1)
multiplied by the Real Exchange Rate Change. We take the previous period to avoid mixing 
quantity effects, stemming from new indebtness from t-1 to t, with price effects, from the real 
exchange rate change. The best available proxy for Domestic Debt for the sample of 
                                                                         
4. It should be noted that Embi spreads reflect sovereign risk while our objective is broader: country risk in general since 
we do not concentrate on public debt only but in all debt denominated in foreign currency, be it public or private. In any 
event, the Embi spread continues to be the best available proxy as sovereign spreads are generally a floor for private 
sector country risk. 
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countries in this study5, are the banking system’s dollar denominated deposits. De Nicoló, 
Honohan and Ize (2003) and Levy-Yeyati (2004) argue that the banking system’s dollar 
denominated deposits should be very close to the banking system dollar-denominated credit 
to the private sector. In fact, prudential regulations generally oblige banks to maintain very 
small open positions in foreign currency. In addition, banks’ dollar denominated credit to the 
private sector should practically be equal to the total domestic indebtness of the private 
sector in foreign currency except for the dollar-denominated debt this sector may issue 
domestically. This is bound to be negligible in most emerging countries. As for the case of 
External Debt, Domestic Debt is a gross concept of (negative) financial wealth since the 
private sector can hold assets in foreign currency and not only liabilities. The difference 
between the two, however, is that External Debt includes all sectors of the economy and 
Domestic Debt only the private sector. In any event, it seems reasonable to think that public 
sector will also have negative wealth in foreign currency held by residents. 
Financial imperfections are proxied by a variable measuring the quality of the 
institutional setting affecting the risk of investment (Creditor Rights). It is the sum of three 
subcomponents: contract viability or expropriation, profits repatriation and payment delays. 
Since this definition of creditor rights is more oriented towards external creditors, we can 
consider it as a ceiling for the creditor rights of domestic creditors in as far as emerging 
countries generally give priority to external debt payments in case of difficulty.   
Competitiveness, the other relevant channel of influence of real exchange rate 
depreciations, is measured by the interaction of a country’s openness (Openness) and the 
change in the effective real exchange rate (Multilateral Real Exchange Rate Change).
As regards the exchange rate regime, we use both de facto and de jure
classifications. In the former, the underlying exchange rate regime is inferred from the 
observed exchange rate movement. The classification by Rogoff and Reinhart (2004) is the 
preferred option since it allows us to keep a larger number of observations than other 
classifications, such as Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenneger (2003). The de jure classification is 
based on the IMF Annual Reports on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions. Given the data limitations, we opt for grouping the classification into three broad 
ones: fixed, intermediate and flexible regimes (see Appendix II for details). 
Finally, a number of control variables are included in all specifications. The first is the 
lag of the sovereign risk (Embi_1), to account for its persistence, as will be shown later. The 
second is the Embi spread for all emerging countries for which it is available (Emerging Embi). 
This should capture a possible similar co-movement stemming from the market integration of 
this asset class and potential contagion effects. At the same time, this control variable allows 
us to pick up possible time effects in the regression. 
From the statistical tables in Appendix 1 (3, 4 and 5), some stylized facts are worth 
mentioning. First, the average of the Real Exchange Rate Change  is a small real appreciation, 
as opposed to a slight real depreciation in the case of the Multilateral Real Exchange Rate 
Change. Second, the average External Debt is around five times that of Domestic Debt. Third, 
the average Real Exchange Rate Change varies only slightly among different exchange rate 
regimes, both in the de jure and de facto classifications: de jure, flexible exchange rate 
regimes appreciate slightly on average while the other two depreciate; de facto, intermediate 
regimes appreciate slightly while the other two depreciate. As could be expected, the largest 
standard deviation is that of de facto flexible exchange rate regimes. These differences 
between classifications can be better understood comparing where each observation stands 
in the two classifications, as shown in Table 4 of Appendix 1. From the 203 available 
observations only 111 find themselves in the same exchange rate regime in the de facto and
de jure classifications. 51 are more flexible de jure than de facto, which we could generally 
                                                                         
5. We would also like to use data on domestic public debt denominated in foreign currency as collected by Reinhart, 
Rogoff and Savastano (2003) but it is only available for a small number of the countries we have included in our analysis. 
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label as “fear of floating” cases. The remaining 41 are more flexible de facto than announced, 
which in 16 of cases coincide with “freely falling” experiences of relatively fixed regimes, as 
labelled by Rogoff and Reinhart (2004). 
Finally, from the matrix of correlations in Table 5, Appendix 1, we can outline other 
characteristics of the data. First, the dependent variable (Embi) is very persistent (with a 
correlation of 0.71 between t and t-1). Second, the correlation between Embi and either the 
Real Exchange Rate Change or the External Debt, and therefore External Balancesheet, is 
positive, in line with the a priori of the financial accelerator literature. However, the correlation 
betwen Embi and ·External Debt is negative, which hints at the idea (confirmed later in our 
results)  that it is not so much the new external indebtness that matters for country risk, but 
the sudden increase in the stock of external debt due to a real depreciation (in other words, 
the balance sheet effect and not the quantity effect). Third, while the correlation between 
Embi and Domestic Debt is negative but very close to zero, that between Embi and Domestic 
Balancesheet is positive and relatively high (higher than for External Balance sheet). Only 
judging from these correlations, we should expect a negative net wealth effect also in the 
case of domestic balance sheets and not only for external ones. Fourth, the fact that the 
correlation between External Debt and Domestic Debt is close to zero seems to indicate that 
there is no clear pattern of complementarity or substitution between the two. Finally, as one 
would expect, the quality of Creditor Rights, ·Exports and Openness are negatively 
correlated with the dependent variable but, contrary to the theoretical literature, the degree of 
Competitiveness (i.e., the product of Openness and Real Exchange Rate Change) is positively 
correlated.
As for the empirical strategy, we opt for a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), 
following Arellano, and Bover (1995). We prefer this option to using OLS so as to (i) remove 
unobserved time-invariant country-specific effects; (ii) account for the potential endogeneity 
arising from the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable in addition to other possibly 
endogenous right-hand side variables (particularly the real exchange rate); and (iii) deal with 
the possibility that the dependent variable is not stationary. The second reason is particularly 
important since there might be instances of reverse causality (from country risk to the real 
exchange). The GMM empirically strategy allows us to take our results on safer grounds. 
The Arellano-Bover estimator, or GMM system estimator, combines the regression 
expressed in first differences (lagged values of the variables in levels are used as instruments) 
with the original equation expressed in levels (this equation is instrumented with lagged 
differences of the variables)6. The disadvantage with this empirical strategy, though, is the 
relatively small number of observations while the conditions to use GMM should be complied 
with asymptotically. As a robustness test, we run all regressions in OLS, with robust standard 
errors. The results remain unchanged. 
                                                                         
6. In all the estimations we present results for a Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions that checks the overall validity 
of the different moment conditions and in all the cases we fail to reject the null hypothesis. 
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5 Results
5.1 The net impact of real exchange depreciations and appreciations 
As a first step, it seems important to confirm whether real exchange rate depreciations raise a 
country’s risk premium. Controlling exclusively for the persistency of the risk premium 
(Embi_1) and the evolution of the asset class (Emerging Embi), a statistically significant 
positive relation is found between the change in the real exchange rate and the risk premium 
(Table 1, column I). Although this first approximation is very general and does not specify the 
channels through which the real exchange rate influences country risk, the result could be 
understood as a net effect. Such negative relation, more in line with the recent open-macro 
financial accelerator models than with the more traditional literature, offers a warning signal to 
emerging countries, which often suffer from real exchange rate depreciations. 
It seems interesting to test whether the effects of real exchange rate changes on a 
country’s risk premium are symmetric, in other words, whether real appreciations lower the 
country risk premium in the same way as real appreciations raise it. As Table 1, column II 
indicates, real exchange rate appreciations (Appr*Real Exchange Rate Change) do not seem 
to contribute to reducing country risk since we cannot reject the hypothesis that their 
coefficient is equal to zero7. This result is in line with the models of financial imperfections, 
which expect detrimental effects of balance sheets only for negative shocks to productivity, 
based on the argument that agency problems may only be binding on the down side 
[Bernanke and Gertler (1989)]. Another plausible explanation are liquidity constraints. The 
asymmetric impact of real depreciations and appreciations may has an important policy 
implication: other things given, it should make emerging countries more reluctant to allow for 
fluctuations in the real exchange rate, not being able to profit from the “good times” (real 
appreciations) while suffering from the bad ones (real depreciations, particularly if sharp). In 
particular, a real exchange depreciation of one percentage point has an immediate impact on 
the risk premium of 25 basis points. 
The question is whether the impact of a real exchange rate depreciation is linearly 
proportional to the size of the latter. In other words, whether it is the same in terms of the 
country’s risk premium to experience small depreciations over time or a sudden large real 
one. Our results offer a negative answer. Table 1, column III shows evidence of an non-linear 
effect of real exchange rate depreciations, accounted for as the square of this variable, and 
the country risk premium. 
                                                                         
7. It should be noted that the asymmetry is a short-run effect, which may disappear in the long run. If the current 
coefficients could be interpreted as long-run ones (dividing them by one minus the estimated coefficient for Embi_1), the 
asymmetry could disappear.  
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Table 1: Impact of real exchange rate changes on the country risk premium1/
Specifications I II III
Number of obs 183 183 183
Embi_1 0.78 *** 0.64 *** 0.68 ***
(0.10) (0.11) (0.11)
Emerging Embi 0.64 *** 0.33 * 0.39 **
(0.18) (0.18) (0.17)
Real Exchange Rate Change 1533.62 **
(606.38)
Appr * Real Exchange Rate Change  (ȕ1) -97.28 120.95
(604.54) (649.11)
Diff Effect Dep *  Real Exchange Rate Change (ȕ2) 2474.57 *** -892.38
(634.17) (623.40)
[Real Exchange Rate Change] 
2
4170.78 ***
(545.02)
Constant -260.77 **
(119.04)
Appr Constant -62.98 -122.95
(114.57) (95.72)
Diff Effect Dep Constant -99.01 129.59 *
(85.62) (75.57)
Sargan test 25.56 (1.00) 22.49 (1.00) 19.69 (1.00)
Ho: ȕ1+ȕ2=0
(p-value)     0.00
H0 can be rejected
The dynamic panel estimation uses one step GMM system estimators with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
Standard errors in parenthesis (p-values for the Sargan tests).
Significance of coefficients: * at 10% ; ** at 5%; *** at 1%
Dependent variable: Embi
Lags dated t-2, t-3 and t-4 for Real Exchange Rate Change, Appr * Real Exchange Rate Change, Diff Effect Dep *  Real Exchange Rate Change 
and [Real Exchange Rate Change] 
2
 were included as instruments.
1/ Results are maintained (i) using OLS with robust standard errors instead of GMM, (ii) including the debt service instead 
of the stock of debt, and/or (ii) subtracting a country’s international reserves to the stock of debt. 
Although real depreciations tend to be detrimental for a country risk premium, we 
find a few observations where the opposite is true. The question is what makes these cases 
different. As a tentative answer, since the small number of observations does not allow us to 
explore the issue more rigorously, we look at the commonalities in the observations in which 
exchange rate depreciations lead to a reduction in a country’s risk premium (23 out of a total 
of 75 depreciations). We refer to this group as the optimistic case. Taking the general case as 
a benchmark (namely the 52 observations in which real exchange rate depreciations lead to 
an increase in the risk premium) and making them equal to 100, the optimistic case is 
characterized by a lower external debt (about 20% lower than in the general case), higher 
tradability (15% higher), and better creditor rights, all as expected (Figure 1). However, they 
also have a much higher domestic dollar-denominated debt (50% more on average than in 
the general case). It is important to notice that exchange rate depreciations are much smaller 
in the optimistic case, which mitigates the relevance of the previously mentioned differences. 
We shall analyze this issue in more detail later. 
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Figure 1: Characteristics of the optimistic case1/ against the general one2/
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In the case of real appreciations, there are a few observations where we find the 
expected positive impact (i.e., a reduction in country risk). We call this the “optimistic case”, 
since it is not generally confirmed in our empirical results, and compare it with the “pessimistic 
one” (where real exchange rate appreciations increase the risk premium). As one would 
expect, the former has more debt (both external and domestic dollar denominated) so that it 
can profit more from its reduction in value after the appreciation. It is also less opened to 
trade, so that it is less damaged by the appreciation. Creditor rights are lower but this is 
probably a less relevant variable than for depreciations since we are not in a binding situation, 
when net wealth falls. 
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Figure 2: Characteristics of the pessimistic case 1/ against the optimist one 
one 2/
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1/ Real appreciations increase the cost of borrowing  
2/ Real appreciations decrease the cost of borrowing. 
5.2 Channels for a real exchange depreciation to influence the risk premium 
We, now, specify the channels through which the real exchange rate may influence a 
country’s cost of borrowing, based on the existing literature. The most important ones might 
be balance sheet effects, from external and domestic dollar denominated debt, and 
competitiveness. Also financial imperfections could be a potential channel in as far as financial 
accelerator theories make balance sheet effects dependent on the existence of such 
imperfections. Focusing exclusively on the external debt, we find that the External 
Balancesheets after a depreciation clearly increase the risk premium while they are not 
significant after an appreciation. (Table 2, column I). The same result is found for Domestic 
Balancesheets (Table 2, columns II and III)8. The latter seems to indicate that domestic private 
sector indebtness in foreign currency has negative wealth effects and not only redistributive 
ones. In turn, competitiveness affects country risk symmetrically and in the expected direction 
(reducing it with a real depreciation and increasing it with an appreciation)9. Better creditor 
rights tend to lower country risk.  
Finally, we try to separate quantity effects from price ones by including in the 
regression the increase in external and domestic dollar denominated debt and export growth, 
all in US dollar. None of the quantity effects are found significant. In the case of external and 
domestic debt, this result can be understood as if the country risk premium were not affected 
by new indebtness but rather by the sudden reduction in net wealth, due to real depreciation. 
This is in line with financial accelerator theories. 
                                                                         
8. The significance of domestic balance sheets, after a depreciation, is weakened (from a level of significance of 1% 
to 10%) when both external and domestic balance sheets are included in the regression (Column III). This is probably 
due to the collinearity between the two variables (Table 5 in Appendix I show a correlation of  0.52). 
9. The correlation between External Balancesheet and Competitiveness is very high, pointing to collinearity problems. An 
analysis of the correlation between parameters confirms this problem. This is why we shall exclude Competitiveness in 
the following regressions, substituting it for Increase Exports which accounts mainly for the quantity effect, as Exports 
are measured in dollars. 
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Table 2: Channels of influence of changes in the real exchange rate1/
Specifications I II III IV
Number of obs 179 152 152 122
Embi_1 0.65 *** 0.65 *** 0.61 *** 0.61 ***
(0.11) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06)
Emerging Embi 0.25 * 0.20 0.15 0.25 ***
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.16)
Appr * External Balancesheet -399.45 -427.05 -357.98
(776.30) (834.89) (1.036.92)
Diff Effect Dep * External Balancesheet 4917.25 *** 3324.59 ** 3496.77 ***
(1.567.73) (1.673.84) (1.737.62)
Increase External Debt -0.46
(1.89)
Appr * Domestic Balancesheet -466.38 -262.96 -583.40
(388.54) (497.92) (808.42)
Diff Effect Dep * Domestic Balancesheet 14455.44 *** 7826.11 * -1758.74
(2.111.46) (4.819.81) (4.752.85)
Increase Domestic Debt 0.02
(0.03)
Appr * Competitiveness 2205.09 ** 1846.57 ** 2096.28 ** 2277.10 *
(977.31) (784.68) (968.15) (1.246.20)
Diff Effect Dep * Competitiveness -5048.16 *** -898.91 -4062.94 *** -4441.31 ***
(1.792.62) (1.045.50) (1.500.05) (1.672.54)
Increase Exports -495.61
(311.58)
Creditor Rights -37.04 * -48.43 ** -47.41 ** -56.76 *
(21.30) (23.01) (21.44) (30.01)
Appr * Constant 283.62 393.01 * 428.82 * -7.90
(237.24) (227.28) (223.46) (46.84)
Diff Effect Dep * Constant -55.37 21.35 -18.03 480.10
(49.99) (55.48) (45.17) (291.02)
Sargan test
The dynamic panel estimation uses one step GMM system estimators with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
Lags dated t-2, t-3 and t-4 for Appr * External Balancesheet, Diff Effect Dep * External  Balancesheet, Increase External Debt,
Appr * Domestic Balancesheet, Diff Effect Dep * Domestic Balancesheet, Increase Domestic Debt,
Appr * Competitiveness and  Diff Effect Dep * Competitiveness were included as instruments.
Standard errors in parenthesis (p-values for the Sargan tests).
Significance of coefficients: * at 10% ; ** at 5%; *** at 1%
6.96 (1.00) 11.98 (1.00)
Dependent variable: Embi
19.42 (1.00) 15.39 (1.00)
1/ Results are maintained (i) using OLS with robust standard errors instead of GMM, (ii) including the debt service instead 
of the stock of debt, and/or (ii) subtracting a country’s international reserves to the stock of debt. 
5.3 How do financial imperfections influence balance sheet effects? 
In the previous set of regressions we have found direct evidence of the detrimental effect of 
financial imperfections on the risk premium. However, financial accelerator theories consider 
financial imperfections more as a condition under which balance sheet effects can increase 
the cost of borrowing than as a separate channel. To test this hypothesis, we interact each 
country’s financial imperfections –proxied with the quality of creditor rights– with balance 
sheet effects, both external and domestic. We separate countries in three groups, those with 
the best creditor rights, those with intermediate ones and those with the poorest. Balance 
sheet effects are clearly larger in the last group, followed by the intermediate one (Table 3, 
columns I and II, respectively). In particular, for the domestic debt only do countries with the 
poorest creditor rights see their risk premium increase because of domestic balance sheet 
effects. In the case of intermediate creditor rights we cannot reject the hypothesis that 
domestic balance sheets have no effect on the risk premium or is even negative for good 
creditor rights (Table 3, bottom of Column III). This could be explained by the fact that 
domestic creditors in the countries with the poorest creditor rights do not trust the system 
enough to use –or keep– their additional net worth at home. 
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Table 3: Financial imperfections and the influence of external and domestic balance 
sheet effects on the risk premium1/
Specifications I II
Number of obs 174 151
Embi_1 0.78 *** 0.63 ***
(0.11) (0.04)
Emerging Embi 0.51 *** 0.49 ***
(0.18) (0.19)
Low Creditor Rights  *  External Balancesheet (Ȗ1) 2514.32 ***
(867.58)
Diff Effect Medium Creditor Rights  *  External Balancesheet (Ȗ2) -659.22
(882.47)
Diff Effect High Creditor Rights  *  External Balancesheet (Ȗ3) -1483.08 *
(853.56)
Low Creditor Rights  *  Domestic Balancesheet (į1) 15868.14 ***
(1.708.31)
Diff Effect Medium Creditor Rights  *  Domestic Balancesheet (į2) -15148.19 ***
(1.901.49)
Diff Effect High Creditor Rights  *  Domestic Balancesheet (į3) -18861.95 ***
(2.705.78)
Increase Exports -493.69 ** -440.31
(242.89) (343.59)
Low Creditor Rights Constant -37.79 86.13
(189.81) (166.94)
Diff Effect Medium Creditor Rights Constant -156.65 -237.62 **
(99.92) (119.19)
Diff Effect High Creditor Rights Constant -174.69 * -279.09 **
(109.67) (123.16)
Sargan test
Ho: Ȗ1+Ȗ3=0 Ho: į1+į2=0
(p-value)     0.01 (p-value)     0.46
H0 can be rejected H0 cannot be rejected
Ho: į1+į3=0
(p-value)     0.04
H0 can be rejected
The dynamic panel estimation uses one step GMM system estimators with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
Standard errors in parenthesis (p-values for the Sargan tests).
Significance of coefficients: * at 10% ; ** at 5%; *** at 1%
Dependent variable: Embi
20.25 (1.00) 17.33 (1.00)
Lags dated t-2, t-3 and t-4 for Low Creditor Rihgts *  External Balancesheet, Diff Effect Medium Creditor Rights *  External 
Balancesheet, Diff Effect High Creditor Rights * External Balancesheet, Low Creditor Rights *  Domestic Balancesheet, Diff Effect
Medium Creditor Rights * Domestic Balancesheet, and Diff Effect High Creditor Rights *  Domestic Balancesheet were included as 
instruments.
1/ Results are maintained (i) using OLS with robust standard errors instead of GMM, (ii) including the debt service instead 
of the stock of debt, and/or (ii) subtracting a country’s international reserves to the stock of debt.
5.4 How does the exchange rate regime influence balance sheet effects? 
After identifying when balance sheet effects are particularly a problem, we now analyze to 
what extent they are influenced by the exchange rate regime in place. This is particularly 
interesting if we consider that the exchange rate regime is an important policy variable for the 
economic authorities. 
As previously mentioned, several theoretical models argue that a fixed exchange rate 
regime amplifies balance sheet effects on the risk premium, This is confirmed in our results, 
when interacting the exchange rate regime and domestic and external balance sheet effects. 
The exchange rate regime is lagged one period to avoid that what was originated by a certain 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 22 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0423
regime is assigned to another one. We use both de jure and de facto classifications and 
compare the results. 
Starting with external balance sheet effects, fixed exchange rate regimes, de jure, 
amplify their detrimental impact on the cost of borrowing (Table 4, column III). This is so when 
compared with the average balance sheet effect, i.e., when the exchange rate regime is not 
considered (Table 4, column I). The flexible regime is clearly superior since we cannot reject 
the hypothesis that external balance sheets under this regime leave the risk premium 
unchanged (Table 4, bottom of column III). When taking the de facto classification, fixed 
regimes are also the most detrimental (Table 4, column II), with a larger coefficient than the 
average case (Table 4, column I). This time the differential effect of the flexible exchange rate 
is not significant but the intermediate one is clearly better than the pegged, although not to 
the extent of eliminating the detrimental effect of external balance sheets on the risk premium. 
In sum, although the results are relatively similar in the two classifications for the fixed 
exchange rate regime, this is not the case for the intermediate and flexible ones. One possible 
explanation is that the de facto classification has twice as many observations under the 
intermediate regime than the de jure classification. The opposite is true for flexible exchange 
rate regimes. This difference is probably explained by the well-known phenomenon of “fear of 
floating”, as countries tend to announce that the exchange rate will move more flexibly than 
they actually allow for. 
Table 4: The exchange rate regime and external balance sheets 1/
Specifications I II III
Number of obs 178 170 177
DE FACTO DE JURE
Embi_1 0.78 *** 0.71 *** 0.73 ***
(0.13) (0.15) (0.12)
Emerging Embi 0.55 *** 0.59 *** 0.57 ***
(0.16) (0.14) (0.17)
External Balancesheet 2489.84 ***
(769.48)
Fixed_1 *  External Balancesheet (Ĭ1) 3333.64 *** 3145.73 ***
(1.158.73) (1.226.52)
Diff Effect Intermediate_1 *  External Balancesheet (Ĭ2) -2741.70 ** -439.06
(1.283.98) (1.633.45)
Diff Effect Flexible_1 *  External Balancesheet (Ĭ3) -1844.16 -2488.72 **
(1.591.65) (1.244.84)
Creditor Rights -50.21 * -29.35 ** -44.53 **
(29.69) (12.18) (22.60)
Increase Exports -470.18 ** -366.91 ** -544.85 **
(249.37) (178.14) (276.72)
Constant 194.83
(324.66)
Constant Fixed_1 147.72 238.28
(171.55) (276.96)
Diff Effect Intermediate_1 Constant -140.66 ** -38.73
(66.87) (60.47)
Diff Effect Flexible_1 Constant -170.01 *** -128.84 **
(64.07) (58.78)
Sargan test
Ho: Ĭ1+Ĭ2=0 Ho: Ĭ1+Ĭ3=0
(p-value)     0.06 (p-value)     0.16
H0 can be rejected H0 cannot be rejected
The dynamic panel estimation uses one step GMM system estimators with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
Standard errors in parenthesis (p-values for the Sargan tests).
Significance of coefficients: * at 10% ; ** at 5%; *** at 1%
18.11 (1.000)22.84 (1.000)
Dependent variable: Embi
23.20 (1.000)
Lags dated t-2, t-3 and t-4 for External Balancesheet, Fixed_1 * External Balancesheet, Diff Effect Intermediate_1 *  External Balancesheet, Diff Effect 
Flexible_1 *  External Balancesheet were included as instruments.
1/ Results are maintained (i) using OLS with robust standard errors instead of GMM, (ii) including the debt service instead 
of the stock of debt, and/or (ii) subtracting a country’s international reserves to the stock of debt.
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In the case of domestic balance sheets, pegged regimes are clearly worse on the 
basis of the de jure classification with double the coefficient than for the average case 
(Table 5, columns III and I, respectively). Intermediate and flexible regimes are clearly superior 
since we cannot reject the hypothesis that balance sheet effects under any of these two 
regimes leave the risk premium unchanged (Table 5, bottom of column III). The differences 
among de facto regimes are not significant (Table 5, column II). 
Table 5: The exchange rate regime and domestic balance sheets1/
Specifications I II III
Number of obs 151 143 177
DE FACTO DE JURE
Embi_1 0.61 *** 0.54 *** 0.63 ***
(0.07) (0.12) (0.06)
Emerging Embi 0.43 ** 0.52 *** 0.51 ***
(0.18) (0.15) (0.15)
Domestic Balancesheet 8100.45 *
(4614.37)
Fixed_1 *  Domestic Balancesheet (ȡ1) 6710.74 16319.13 ***
(5.110.24) (717.04)
Diff Effect Intermediate_1 *  Domestic Balancesheet (ȡ2) -2323.34 -15153.64 ***
(5.545.48) (1.605.39)
Diff Effect Flexible_1 *  Domestic Balancesheet (ȡ3) -674.53 -13334.29 ***
(9.472.57) (1.987.78)
Increase Exports -411.67 -236.83 -495.17
(374.42) (175.40) (332.18)
Creditor Rights -67.37 ** -35.85 ** -48.43 *
(46.55) (10.29) (28.94)
Constant 500.59
(471.63)
Constant Fixed_1 309.68 267.86
(156.25) (278.76)
Diff Effect Intermediate_1 Constant -149.44 80.70
(104.02) (62.24)
Diff Effect Flexible_1 Constant -132.10 -37.61
(105.82) (38.23)
Sargan test
Ho: ȡ1+ȡ2=0
(p-value)    0.41
H0 cannot be rejected
Ho: ȡ1+ȡ3=0
(p-value)    0.22
H0 cannot be rejected
The dynamic panel estimation uses one step GMM system estimators with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
Standard errors in parenthesis (p-values for the Sargan tests).
Significance of coefficients: * at 10% ; ** at 5%; *** at 1%
Dependent variable: Embi
20.32 (1.000) 17.51 (1.000) 15.10 (1.000)
Lags dated t-2, t-3 and t-4 for Domestic Balancesheet, Fixed_1 *  Domestic Balancesheet, Diff Effect Intermediate_1 * Domestic Balancesheet, and Diff Effect 
Flexible_1 * Domestic Balancesheet were included as instruments.
1/ Results are maintained (i) using OLS with robust standard errors instead of GMM, (ii) including the debt service instead 
of the stock of debt, and/or (ii) subtracting a country’s international reserves to the stock of debt.
Given its policy implications, it seems worth exploring why it is the case that pegged 
regimes behave worse than others. As a tentative answer (since the small number of 
observations does not allow us to explore the issue more rigorously) we look at the 
commonalities in the observations under a fixed regime and compare them with those for 
intermediate and flexible regimes10.
Fixed exchange rate regimes tend to accumulate more external debt and 
domestic dollar-denominated debt, as argued by Ize and Levy-Yeyati (2003) and Broda and 
Levy-Yeyati (2003)11. This is more the case in de facto than de jure classification 
(Figure 3 and 4), which might be explained by the fact that some of the announced pegged 
                                                                         
10. The number of observations for each group can be found in Table 3, Appendix 1. 
11. This is the case not only in levels, as shown in Figures 3 and 4, but much more so when we look at the rates of 
change of external debt form t-1 to t.  This is not included in the graph because of the differences in scale. 
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regimes are not expected to be maintained (in fact there are much fewer observations for 
de facto pegs than de jure). The same might be true for some of the intermediate regimes 
which are announced (particularly crawling pegs).  No clear trend appears for Domestic 
Debt12.
Another plausible explanation, other than the accumulation of foreign currency debt, 
could be that real exchange rate depreciations are larger under fixed exchange rate regimes. 
As Table 3 in Appendix 1 shows, this is not the case either in the de jure or de facto 
classifications, since the observations under the pegged regime do not have the largest 
average real depreciation. It could, nevertheless, happen that pegs suffer more frequently 
from events of very large depreciations, which we have shown to be more detrimental. 
Looking at the 5% extreme values of the right tail of our distribution (i.e., the largest real 
depreciations), this does not seem to be the case. In fact, most of the extreme observations 
fall under intermediate regimes both in the de jure or de facto classifications. 
Figure 3: Characteristics of managed and flexible exchange rate regimes 
against fixed ones: De facto classification 
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12. In the specific intermediate regimes, de facto, domestic dollar denominated debt is actually lower. 
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Figure 4: Characteristics of managed and flexible exchange rate regimes against 
fixed ones: De jure classification 
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In sum, from this cursory exploration of the data, the most plausible explanation for 
the more detrimental balance sheet effects under pegged regimes is the relatively larger 
accumulation of external dollar-denominated debt, coupled with the existence of poorer 
creditor rights, and not so much the accumulation of a larger depreciation or extreme 
depreciation events under pegged regimes. This is in line with the idea that fixed exchange 
rates tend to be perceived as an implicit insurance by the private sector and that public 
authorities may increase their dollar-denominated indebtness as a demonstration effect that 
the regime will be maintained. 
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6 Conclusions and policy implications 
This paper builds upon the empirical literature on the impact of real exchange rate 
depreciations for the economy as a whole. In particular, it confirms Berganza, Chang and 
García-Herrero (2003)’s finding of a positive relation between changes in the real exchange 
rate and a country’s risk premium for a sample of 27 emerging economies and explores 
additional questions to determine what makes balance sheet effects so detrimental for the 
risk premium. 
We show evidence that the effect of a real depreciation is neither symmetric nor 
linear. On the former, real appreciations are not found significant in reducing a country’s risk 
premium, while real depreciations clearly increase it. The immediate effect of a real 
depreciation of one percentage points is an increase in the country risk premium by 25 basis 
points. On the latter, sharp real depreciations have much larger negative effects than smaller 
ones. This should make policy makers wary of real exchange rate volatility, particularly if large, 
since there is no period when they clearly benefit from it. There are, however, a few cases in 
our sample, where exchange rate depreciations reduce the risk premium. A cursory look at 
the characteristics of these observations points to the importance of having a relatively low 
level of external debt, higher trade openness and better creditor rights, for real exchange rate 
depreciations to be beneficial. 
We also show that the main channels for the exchange rate to affect country risk are 
external and domestic balance sheets, stemming from the sudden increase in the stock of 
external debt and domestic dollar-denominated debt after a real depreciation. In the case of 
domestic balance sheets, this can be interpreted as evidence of the presence of wealth 
effects and not only redistribution ones. In addition, the same asymmetric impact is found for 
balance sheets as for the real exchange rate; that is, the reduction in the stock of 
foreign-currency debt after a real appreciation does not reduce country risk. On the contrary, 
the degree of competitiveness appears to have a symmetric effect –and with the expected 
sign– on country risk. In any event, the evidence of a positive and highly significant relation 
between the exchange rate change and country risk, which can be considered a net effect, 
indicates that competitiveness is not an important enough factor to outweigh the detrimental 
impact of balance sheets. New external and domestic dollar denominated indebtness is not 
found significant, suggesting that what matters is not so much the amount of new borrowing 
but rather the sudden reduction in net financial wealth because of a price change. 
When financial imperfections are considered (proxied by the quality of creditor rights) 
our results confirm the a priori of the financial accelerator literature: the poorer creditor rights 
are, the more external and domestic balance sheet effects increase the risk premium. Finally, 
fixed exchange rate regimes appear to amplify the negative impact of balance sheet effects 
on the risk premium. This seems to be related to the fact that pegged regimes have a bigger 
(and faster growing) stock of external debt, on average, and not so much to the extent of the 
real depreciation. The latter is not larger, on average, under this regime, not even the number 
of events of large depreciations, which have been found to be particularly detrimental through 
the result of non-linearity. A plausible explanation for the potential causal relation between a 
pegged regime and a larger external debt is that this regime is perceived as an implicit 
insurance by the private sector. In the same vein, public authorities may increase their 
dollar-denominated indebtness as a demonstration effect that the peg will be maintained. 
In sum, a number of policy conclusions can be drawn from these results. The 
volatility of the real exchange rate, especially if large, is something to worry about in emerging 
countries. This is because it tends to increase country risk, a key variable for economic 
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growth, in an asymmetric and non-linear way. The main channels through which the real 
exchange rate affect the risk premium are external and domestic balance sheet effects and, 
to a lesser extent, competitiveness, in the opposite direction. Therefore, the countries that 
should worry most are those with small trade openness, large financial imperfections and 
pegged exchange rate regimes, which are associated with bigger and faster growing external 
indebtness. The combination of these three characteristics can make real exchange rate 
depreciations particularly detrimental for a country’s risk premium, an extremely important 
variable for emerging countries in need of external financing because of its strong impact on 
economic growth. Given that these three characteristics can be influenced by economic 
authorities, there is clear a role for policy action to mitigate the problem. 
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APPENDIX I : STATISTICAL ISSUES 
Table 1 
Countries and years included 
Country name Years Number of years
Algeria 1999-2002 4
Argentina 1993-2002 10
Brazil 1993-2002 10
Bulgaria 1994-2002 9
Chile 1999-2002 4
China 1994-2002 9
Colombia 1997-2002 6
Cote D´lvoire 1998-2002 5
Croatia 1996-2002 7
Ecuador 1995-2002 8
Malaysia 1996-2002 7
Mexico 1993-2002 10
Morocco 1993-2002 10
Nigeria 1993-2002 10
Panama 1996-2002 7
Peru 1997-2002 6
Philippines 1993-2002 10
Poland 1994-2002 9
Republic of Lebanon 1998-2002 5
Russian Federation 1997-2002 6
Slovakia 1993-2002 10
South Africa 1994-2002 9
South Korea 1993-2002 10
Thailand 1997-2002 6
Turkey 1996-2002 7
Venezuela 1993-2002 10
Zimbabwe 1997-2002 6
No. of observations 210
Table 2 
Geographical distribution of the sample 
Region
Number of 
countries
Number of 
observations
as a % of total 
sample
Asia 5 42 20.0
Latin America 9 71 33.8
Eastern Europe 6 48 22.9
Africa 6 44 21.0
Middle East 1 5 2.4
TOTAL 27 210 100
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics of the regression variables 
Table 4 
Relation between the classification of de jure and de facto exchange rate regimes 
Variable No. Obs. Mean Std. Deviation Minimun Maximun
Embi 210 560.40 515.95 60.233 3925.75
Emerging Embi 210 617.47 143.61 352.72 1007.55
Real Exchange Rate Change 208 -0.019 0.1561 -0.8126 0.895
Fixed real exchange rate change de facto 55 -0.009 0.152 -0.319 0.895
Intermediate real exchange rate de facto 109 0.011 0.115 -0.257 0.415
Flexible  real exchange rate de facto 38 -0.036 0.231 -0.813 0.616
Fixed real exchange rate change de jure 73 -0.009 0.164 -0.448 0.895
Intermediate real exchange rate de jure 68 -0.012 0.167 -0.813 0.529
Flexible  real exchange rate de jure 67 0.0159 0.135 -0.266 0.415
Effective real exchange rate change 210 0.0044 0.1477 -0.3746 1,137
External Debt 209 0.5683 0.2589 0.1473 1,561
Increase External Debt 208 3.75 10.43 -17.43 41.66
External Balancesheet 207 0.0018 0.0928 -0.3071 0.6432
Domestic Debt 155 0.1132 0.2721 0 2,109
Increase Domestic Debt 143 69.68 478.83 -100 5091.47
Domestic Balancesheet 172 -0.0024 0.0248 -0.1485 0.163
Openness 208 0.3642 0.2107 0.05903 1,195
Competitiveness 207 -0.0017 0.0388 -0.1348 0.2254
Increase Exports 203 0.0714 0.1485 -0.3651 0.7998
Creditor rights 208 7.21 2.11 2 12
FIXED INTERM FLEXIB TOTAL
FIXED 41 25 5 71
INTERM 8 47 11 66
FLEXIB 6 37 23 66
TOTAL 55 109 39 203
DE FACTO
DE JURE
More flexibility than 
announced
(41 Observations)
Same classification
(111 Observations)Fear of flexibility
(51 Observations)
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Embi Embi_1
Emerging 
Embi
Real 
Exchange 
Rate 
Change
Multilateral 
Real
Exchange 
Rate Change
External 
Debt
Increase 
External 
Debt
External 
Balancesheet
Domestic 
Debt
Increase 
Domestic Debt
Domestic 
Balancesheet Openness Competitiveness
Increase 
Exports
Creditor 
Rights
Embi 1.00
Embi_1 0.71 1.00
Emerging Embi 0.18 0.07 1.00
Real Exchange Rate Change 0.31 0.00 0.00 1.00
Multilateral Real Exchange Rate Ch 0.35 0.06 0.16 0.83 1.00
External Debt 0.36 0.35 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 1.00
Increase External Debt -0.29 -0.33 -0.02 -0.22 -0.13 -0.20 1.00
External Balancesheet 0.32 0.02 0.07 0.93 0.87 0.00 -0.17 1.00
Domestic Debt -0.07 -0.11 0.01 -0.09 -0.08 0.04 0.09 -0.09 1.00
Increase Domestic Debt 0.06 0.02 0.02 -0.10 -0.15 -0.02 -0.03 -0.10 -0.05 1.00
Domestic Balancesheet 0.35 0.14 -0.04 0.51 0.45 -0.02 -0.13 0.52 -0.81 0.01 1.00
Openness -0.17 -0.09 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 0.36 -0.02 -0.04 -0.22 -0.05 0.10 1.00
Competitiveness 0.20 -0.10 0.04 0.71 0.84 -0.13 -0.17 0.75 -0.02 -0.11 0.26 -0.12 1.00
Increase Exports -0.10 0.11 0.15 -0.17 -0.10 -0.14 0.16 -0.15 0.05 -0.05 -0.16 0.08 -0.10 1.00
Creditor Rights -0.40 -0.32 -0.16 -0.07 -0.14 -0.01 0.01 -0.11 0.09 -0.20 -0.08 0.21 -0.10 -0.10 1.00
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APPENDIX II: DATA SOURCES AND VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Below we list the variables and sources used for this study, as well as the transformations 
made to the data. The data are annual and cover the periods and countries shown in Table 1. 
Dependent variable 
* Embi: Country risk premium or spread in the external cost of borrowing: equals 
returns for US dollar-denominated Brady bonds, loans, Eurobonds, and 
US dollar-denominated local markets instruments for emerging markets minus total returns 
for U.S. Treasury bonds with similar maturity (the stripped yields of the Emerging Markets 
Bond Index, Embi, for each country). The spreads are measured in basis points. 
Source: JP Morgan. 
Objective variables 
* External Debt: equals the total debt in convertible currencies owed to 
nonresidents, as the end of the reporting year in US dollars divided by the nominal GDP in 
1995 in US dollars, so as to take into account the relative size of the country. 
Source: The Institute of International Finance (IIF). 
* Domestic Debt: proxied by the domestic deposits in U.S. dollars divided by the 
nominal GDP in 1995 US dollars to take into account the relative size of the country. 
Source: International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
Levy-Yeyati (2004).  
* “Real” Exchange Rate: equals the average number of units of local currency per 
U.S. dollar during the year adjusted by the inflation price index (with 1995=1) divided by the 
nominal exchange rate in 1995. Thus, in 1995, Real Exchange Rate is equal to 1 and an 
increase (decrease) in Real Exchange Rate is a depreciation (appreciation). 
Source: IIF. 
* Multilateral Real Exchange Rate: is an annual average index of the nominal 
effective exchange rate of the local currency with respect to six leading trading partners, 
deflated by the relative consumer prices. An increase (decrease) in Multilateral Real Exchange 
Rate is a depreciation (appreciation). 
Source: IIF.
* “Real” Exchange Rate Change: equals the changes in “Real” Exchange Rate
between year t and year t-1. (·ln “real” exchange rate). 
* Multilateral Real Exchange Rate Change: equals the changes in Multilateral 
Real Exchange Rate  between year t and year t-1. (·ln effective real exchange rate). 
* Exports: equals the total value of export of goods and services to nonresidents, 
valued at market prices in millions of US dollars.  
Source: IIF. 
* Openness: is defined as the ratio of Exports to the nominal GDP in 1995 U.S. 
dollars.
Source: IIF. 
* External Balancesheet: equals the product of External Debt in year t-1 and 
“Real” Exchange Rate Change between the years t-1 and t. 
* Domestic Balancesheet: equals the product of  Domestic Debt in year t-1 and 
“Real” Exchange Rate Change between the years t-1 and t.
* Competitiveness: equals the product of Openness in year t-1 and Multilateral 
Real Exchange Rate Change between the years t-1 and t. 
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* Creditor Rights: measure the quality of the institutional setting affecting the risk of 
investment. The rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents, each with a maximum 
score of 4 and a minimum score of 0. A score of 4 indicates a very good environment for 
creditors and 0 a very poor. The subcomponents are: contract viability/expropriation, profits 
repatriation and payment delays. Countries are divided into three groups: low, medium and 
high creditor rights. 
Source: International Country Risk Guide. 
Control variables 
* Emerging Embi: equals the average of the stripped yields of the Emerging 
Markets Bond Index, Embi.
Source: JP Morgan. 
* Appreciation (Appr): is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if Real 
Exchange Rate Change is negative and zero otherwise. Real Exchange Rate Change is never 
zero throughout our sample.
* De facto classification of exchange rate regimes: From the 15 groups considered 
in Rogoff and Reinhart (2004), we group them in three groups: (i) fixed, which includes codes 
such as “no separate legal tender”, “pre announced peg or currency board arrangement”, 
“pre announced horizontal band” and “de facto peg”; (ii) intermediate, composed of “pre 
announced crawling peg”, “pre announced crawling band”, “de facto crawling peg”, “de facto 
crawling band”, “moving band” and “managed floating”; and (iii) flexible, including “freely 
floating” and “freely falling”. The group “dual market in which parallel market data is missing” 
(7 observations in our sample) is left out of the classification. A dummy variable is defined for 
each group. 
Source: Rogoff and Reinhart (2004). 
* De jure classification of exchange rate regimes: Every IMF member country is 
required to report and publish each year the stated intentions of the central bank yielding a 
de jure classification. From the 8 groups considered, we group them in three groups: (i) fixed,
which includes “exchange arrangement with no separate legal tender”, “currency board 
arrangement”, “conventional pegged arrangement” and “pegged exchange rate within 
horizontal bands”; (ii) intermediate, composed of “crawling peg”, “crawling band” and 
“managed floating with no pre-announced path for the exchange rate”; and, (iii) flexible,
including “independently floating”. A dummy variable is defined for each group. 
Source: Annual Reports of Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Rate Restrictions 
(IMF).
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